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Summary 
The Philippines are a “gambling republic” in which politicians hold “power without 
virtue”, dominating by means of “capital, coercion and crime”. Individual power holders 
are “bosses”, acting in a “mafia-style” and employing “guns, goons and gold” in order to 
gain, uphold or enhance their power positions. Whereas the politicians at times make use 
of vigilantes, private armies, death squads and hired contract-killers, the state itself resorts 
to “state terror” to counter the leftist threat posed by the Communist New People’s Army 
and its various offshoots, as a sideline killing hundreds of people in extralegal executions. 
Local power remains “in the family”, and national power is diffused in an “anarchy of 
families”. All of these characterizations of Philippine politics put in quotation marks are 
taken out of scientific books, articles and statements of Philippine state officials and 
politicians. 
While Philippine politics certainly is much more than captured in these 
characterizations, this report takes them as a starting point to analyze Philippine politics 
as if it was crime, or as “criminalized governance” (Briscoe 2008: 4), arguing that criminal 
activities do not only connect to politics in an erratic and unsystematic way, but seem to 
be a durable and integral part of politics from the local to the national levels.  
The model for the analysis is provided by organized crime, which is characterized by 
the twin goals of wealth and power and bases its activities on two fundamental norms: 
that violence is no sole prerogative of a relatively autonomous state, but can be used as a 
private instrument of social control and empowerment by the organization (in political 
contexts read: ruling class) subject only to considerations of prudence and that the 
boundary between legal and illegal, licit and illicit behavior is of no importance, except for 
the calculation of costs and benefits accrued to alternative strategies of action.  
Following Tilly, who likened state-making to organized crime, a conceptual basis for 
understanding politics as crime is given. The fundamental traits of one specific 
manifestation of criminal governance – the traditional Mafia – is presented with respect 
to structure, normative environment and behavior, as this specific form can provide the 
“flesh and skin” to the “skeleton” of rather abstract characterizations of organized crime, 
which try to delimit the universal phenomenon as such. Even more important, many of 
the patterns presented with respect to the traditional Mafia have a decidedly familiar ring 
to the Philippine case.  
The major part of this report is dedicated to the description and analysis of two major 
aspects of Philippine politics which illustrate the appropriateness of the comparison to the 
traditional Mafia: the private use of violence for particularistic ends of personal 
domination and the systematic involvement of Philippine politicians and administrators 
in illicit business ventures – mostly in the form of rent-seeking, analyzed by using the 
example of the illegal game of chance Jueteng. In addition a short analysis of the policy of 
peace pacts, with which contending politicians try to minimize the violent fall-out of 
political competition, is given, because as this very policy paradoxically underscores the 
right to self-help in the political sphere.  
 II 
The conclusion focuses on recommendations for reform aiming at the strengthening 
and restructuring of the Philippine state and political system.  
A first set asks for a significantly strengthened insulation of the law enforcement 
authorities, so that they can no longer be instrumentalized or pressured by politicians. 
This ought to be complemented by significant strengthening of effectiveness through 
training and qualification, recruitment of additional personnel and abolition of auxiliary 
organizations that not only have a long history but also an equally long bad track record 
with respect to human rights violations. In addition, the gun-policy ought to be 
significantly tightened. When, as currently a national gun-ban can be enforced in times of 
heightened political competition during the election periods, this should likewise be 
feasible during normal times. Over time such a change in policy would render guns less 
natural accessories in the Philippine public.  
Specific measures undermining the patronal position of Philippine politicians and 
institutionalizing politics would be the abolishment of the pork-barrel funds, which 
currently seem to be much used not only to further development in the politicians’ 
constituencies, but to project the image of the benevolent patron and thereby establish 
long-term particularistic and personalistic dependency relations, which stabilize patron –
client bonds. This could be complemented by a significant strengthening of the 
Commission on Audit, so that malfeasance and corruption do no longer go unpunished.  
Finally, two long-term strategies aiming at a reframing of institutional incentives for 
politicians are proposed: Firstly, a change of the electoral system towards a system of 
proportional representation, as this holds the potential of uncoupling political office from 
local dominance. Secondly, political parties should be publicly financed, so that office-
holders would no longer need to plunder public office to recoup their outlays and 
“reimburse” their benefactors through preferential treatment.  
The analysis of the Philippine politics illustrates that a deeper look at the crime-
politics nexus is worthwhile, not only in failed or nearly failed states, but also in rather 
durable and not endangered ones. It also illustrates, that in order to analyze criminality in 
politics, we need not necessarily look for criminal organizations aiming to take over or 
control the state from the outside through co-opted or bribed politicians, but might better 
take into account the possibility, that the political class itself exemplifies a significant 
number of characteristics in outlook and behavior, which make them resemble criminal 
actors.  
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1.  Introduction 
Textbook titles on Philippine politics show a very common trend: The Philippines are an 
“unholy nation” in which gambling is so central that it might likewise be called a “gam-
bling republic”. Politicians hold “power without virtue”, this power being based not on 
free and fair elections, but on “capital, coercion and crime” or “guns, goons and gold”. 
Especially at the local level the politician has to have the qualities of a “boss”, in order to 
stay in power so that eventually he can pass it on to succeeding generations of the family. 
If successful, political power will become a family affair, because local offices and strategic 
connections to the national level are “all in the Family”. And as this is not simply a local 
pattern, happening here and there, but a predominant one, the whole system might be 
likened to “an anarchy of families”, the underlying pattern tagged “bossism”. Under 
scrutiny these local and national “Rulemakers” show themselves to be a “modern 
Principalia,” an oligarchy perfectly adapted to the changed conditions of modernity, who 
succeeded in capturing state power, but also commanding significant private firepower 
underwriting its personal rule by “state terror” if necessary. Economically those modern 
oligarchs rely on “booty capitalism”, sometimes also designated as “crony capitalism” 
whereby “patrimony” perpetuates itself economically. All of these, however, are no new 
phenomena, but have been there forever in this “changeless land”.1  
But it is not only in textbooks and newspapers that such characteristics are exposed. 
Even high ranking representatives of the state like the chief of the Philippine National 
Police (PNP), Jesus Verzosa (2010), openly speak about warlords and private or partisan 
armed groups (PAG) and retired Army Generals give lectures on “the Anatomy of 
Warlordism in the Philippines” (Echeverria 2010).  
These descriptions are not counterweighted by positive statements. In this report it is 
argued that it might make sense to take the tags, which are used to characterize Philippine 
politics, absolutely seriously. Familism, bossism, coercion, violence, corruption, booty 
capitalism, gambling empires, and private armed groups – this actually resembles much 
more traditional or semi-traditional organized crime than what is commonly understood 
as politics.  
This report analyzes Philippine politics under a perspective of crime, because criminal 
activities in this country do not connect to politics only in an erratic and unsystematic 
way, but seem to be a durable and integral part of politics from the local to the national 
level. The concepts of “criminalized governance” (Briscoe 2008: 4) or Mafia-style politics 
are used here in a “sensitizing” way, that is, they aim at giving “the user a general sense of 
 
 
1  The citations in this paragraph are all taken from titles of scientific literature on the Philippines (see: 
Azurin 2008, Coronel 1996, Coronel et al. 2004, Hutchcroft 1998, Ibon Foundation 2005, Institute for 
Popular Democracy 1992, Lacaba 1995, Linantud 1998, McCoy 1994, Nery 2003, Sidel 1999, Simbulan 
2005, Timberman 1991). 
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reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances” (Blumer 1954: 7). The use of 
these rather unfamiliar frames is based on the observation of a certain phenomenological 
sameness or similarity between the environmental embeddedness, internal structure, 
patterns of action and cultural background of the traditional Italian Mafia and Philippine 
politics. However, this report does not want to do away with more orthodox definitions of 
politics and governance. It only aims at complementing them with an alternative view 
that strongly focuses on the criminal representation of politics.  
In a general sense organized crime is characterized by the goals of “money and power 
whose procurement is not limited by legal or moral concerns”, it has a “vertical power 
structure” and limited membership, it constitutes a subculture, is governed by rules and 
regulations and perpetuates itself through time; “violence is a readily available and 
routinely accepted resource” and the organization “strives for hegemony over a particular 
geographic area” and/or a particular industry (Abadinsky 2010: 2-5).2 This definition 
already shows that politics (power) need not, but can be one activity of criminal 
organizations.  
However, criminal organization can take numerous forms. For our case especially 
interesting is the classical “Italian model” of the Mafia in its various guises. Employing the 
narrower Mafia model provides us not only with the “bones” of the phenomenon, but 
clothes them with flesh and skin of specific historical developments, actors, social 
practices and cultural background, and thereby translates the abstract concept into a 
historical representation, which can then be used in order to look for similarities with 
Philippine politics. By making use of such an enculturated model, it becomes visible that 
Mafia, has always been much more than crime, and a significant part of that extra-
dimension has been political and governance related. This governance function of the 
Mafia provides the basis for analysing Philippine politics as if it were organized crime. So, 
while the one is crime and governance, the other is governance and crime. 
I am well aware, that Philippine politics and governance are not identical to crime, as 
there is a large number of well-meaning politicians and public servants highly committed 
to good governance, democracy, rule-of-law and development and even the much 
criticized traditional politicians (so-called trapos, for traditional politicians) to a certain 
extent look after their clients’ welfare and try to bring betterment, to guarantee law and 
order in their respective bailiwicks. 
The report is structured as follows: First the relationship between politics, state and 
crime is discussed. Building upon Tilly’s conceptualisation of state-making as organized 
crime and a short presentation of the traditional Italian Mafia, viewed as a social 
configuration that can to a certain extent be alluded to as “illegal state” (Paoli 2003: 130), 
 
 
2  Quite a number of these core characteristics are contentious. Whereas for example there is the common 
assumption of hierarchy, newer research argues, that the level of hierarchization is dependent on the 
contestability of the industry in which the organization specializes (Leeson/Rogers no year given) 
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a model of Philippine politics Mafia-style is developed. Section three analyzes the 
horizontal and vertical uses of private violence employed or commissioned by politicians, 
the main focus being on horizontal intra-elite violence, which always lurks in the 
background in escalating political conflicts. Vertical “repressive” violence targeting 
activists, unionists, unruly tenants, urban poor, criminals or journalists and judges will 
only briefly be touched.3 Section four focuses on one strategy for diminishing horizontal 
“intra-elite” violence, the so called peace pacts, which, however, acknowledge exactly this 
autonomous capacity for violence it purports to circumscribe. Section five gives an 
example for the systematic enmeshment of politicians in illegal business (gambling), 
representing pars pro toto the huge array of illegal or semi-legal business ventures of 
Philippine politicians. The last chapter provides a discussion of concepts and presents 
options for institutional reform that could help in decriminalizing Philippine politics.  
2.  Politics, the state and crime 
“To combat and destroy the kingdom of the mafia it is necessary – it is indispensable – that 
the government cease to be the king of the mafia!” (Napoelone Colajanni 1900, cited in 
Fentress 2000: 246). 
If politics is to be analyzed according to models that are normally applied to organized 
crime of one or another variant only, then there must be some common ground, from 
which such a shift can proceed. This common ground will be established in the following 
pages – arguing that state-making qualifies as an effort to assert a protection racket on a 
given territory and that such rackets, even if they do not totally monopolize violence in a 
given territory, actually assume tasks normally seen to be at the heart of statehood and 
that therefore the two can easily merge under concrete historical circumstances – as for 
example in the Philippines.  
2.1  State-making as organized crime  
Thinking about politics and crime takes us back to Charles Tilly’s argument about war- 
and state-making, both of which, he states, “qualify as our largest examples of organized 
crime” (Tilly 1985: 169). State-making in Tilly’s understanding is a process through which 
one of several competing powers succeeds in establishing a territorially defined monopoly 
on the use of force, monopolizing the right to tax a population in exchange for the 
provision of protection and being accepted as an equal by other powers, who dominate 
other territories in similar ways. One necessary condition of success is that competitors 
are eliminated in one’s “own” territory. In Europe this process centred on the 
 
 
3  For a detailed analysis of these types of violence see Kreuzer 2007, Kreuzer 2009. 
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“demilitarisation of the great lords” (Tilly 1985: 174) which meant the destruction of their 
autonomous capabilities to project violence and to change their practices of violent 
conflict resolution. The early state-builders also had to convert the corresponding cultural 
codes of honour and duelling into cultural taboos. Only if successful in all of these tasks, 
could the state-builder eventually claim a monopoly on legitimate force.  
However, in quite a number of world regions, states are still in the making. Even 
though the Philippines has a rather long history of modern statehood, I argue, that in this 
country, as in many others, neither of these crucial tasks of state-building have been fully 
accomplished. We still encounter “great lords” that command “personal bands of armed 
retainers” and resort to violence in order to settle disputes amongst themselves and 
control those below them. While there are no agents of violence competing on a national 
scale with “the state”, there is a huge number of regions, which are either characterized by 
private local monopolies, which are contested amongst the local “barons” or hybrid 
regimes in which state and private force compete for supremacy. Those semi-autonomous 
specialists of violence and protection dominating the political realm are variously 
denominated as political families, strongmen, bosses and warlords. The practice of private 
violence is culturally tabooed on a superficial level at best and perpetuated from 
generation to generation to the very present.  
2.2  Criminalized governance, parallel state, para-politics and other 
conceptual innovations 
Even though Tilly with his article pointed out a broadly neglected perspective on political 
action, there were hardly any follow-ups that concentrated on the interface of crime and 
politics by giving priority to or at least equal status to the “criminal lens”.  
One of the few exceptions is Briscoe’s study of parallel states (2008), in which he takes 
note of the multitude of clandestine or hidden powers which are situated “in a large 
domain of social violence, stretching between the explicit state backing of the use of force 
[…] and the purely criminal, non-state use of violence” (Briscoe 2008: 3). Irrespective of 
organizational or cultural formation, clandestine types of state-sponsored or tolerated 
violence result in a criminalization of the state or a comprehensive political criminal 
nexus, which, depending on the type, can be described as parallel state, corrupt state, 
mafia state, or warlordism (Briscoe 2008: 3-6) – all four with significant overlap. 
Criminalized governance is a common feature for all of these four types. The mafia-state 
in Briscoes understanding is characterized by a symbiosis of crime and government or a 
criminal takeover of the state.  
A conceptual alternative focussing on the same phenomenon of extralegal governance 
could be para-politics, which departs from the assumption, that, “crime [is, P.K.] a 
continuation of the state by other means” (Wilson 2009: 29). The central focus of this 
research is the duplicity of politics, which always includes illegal and clandestine action in 
order to uphold political domination. Structurally, para-politics translates into the notion 
that states fragment into legal and illegal, overt and covert, cooperating and competing  
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“sub-statist entities that, under the appropriate local conditions, have been capable of 
serving as the bearer of a divisible sovereignty. Some of these entities originate from within 
the state apparatus; others began as their opponents. In the end, however, they may become 
states, quasi-states or ‘shadow states’ in themselves, exerting functions of governance even if 
devoid of the formal signs of the state. This is termed ‘shadow governance’, the acquisition 
of the functions of governmentality by sub-statist groups or structures by means both 
judicial and extra-judicial” (Wilson 2009: 29).  
The hallmark of this dual state is its being legal and extra-legal at the same time, making 
the extra-legal activities integral parts of state-action (Wilson 2009, 30, Cribb 2009: 1). 
Conceptual advances in this vein are characterized by a focus on the aspects of 
domination, power and “the dark side of the state” to take an alteration of a famous title 
by Michael Mann.  
Mafia-state, parallel state, dual-state, shadow state and para-politics, these conceptual 
inventions share one common aim: to point to the convergence of crime and politics, to 
the criminalization of government and governance, which tends to remain invisible in 
more orthodox analyzes of political systems and processes, which, however, can probably 
distort the working logic of a political system in a more or less comprehensive way. A 
Mafia-style politics would then be one specific manifestation of para-politics. It is 
especially illuminating, as it can provide a significant amount of cultural and structural 
“flesh” that fits the Philippine case quite well.  
The following pages take the analogy to the Mafia seriously, as they aim at a 
characterization of the (traditional) Mafia that allows us to understand it as a concrete 
historically situated and enculturated crimino-political phenomenon. This 
characterization aims at capturing the crucial traits of the Mafia and its environment 
while remaining on a sufficiently abstract level, so that the analogy to and comparison 
with Philippine politics remains possible.  
2.3 Defining and describing criminal governance – mafia style 
In the second half of the 19th century the Mafia grew out of traditional Patron-client 
bonds, displaying a pronounced code of honor. Being kinship based, the Mafia can be 
described as a segmentary society in which the various segments (families/clans) 
characterized by structural similarity and relative autonomy co-operate and compete with 
each other. Families/clans are not only of similar type, but in principle also of similar 
rank. As such, they enjoy similar comprehensive rights and duties and are holistic entities 
encompassing the social, cultural and political sphere (Paoli 2001: 159). Similar to the 
state as conceived by Tilly, they derive their legitimacy from the recognition of all 
structurally homologous groups, dependent on their proven control over a certain 
territory (Paoli 2003: 52). Like states recognize each other as similar phenomena, so do 
local Mafia groups (cosca or cosche). Contrary to public perception the segments, i.e. the 
cosche, are rather small, mostly not encompassing more than a few dozen men 
(Leeson/Rogers no year given: 14). 
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They develop and survive in an environment which is characterized by low levels of 
generalized trust, which, however, is substituted by specific forms of personalized trust 
and extended systems of instrumental friendship. With respect to business, the Mafia 
traditionally occupied the role of a broker, slowly turning to legal and illegal business as 
their mainstay, advancing and safeguarding their interests by penetrating politics and 
state administration to such an extent, that in some localities politics becomes a kind of 
subsystem to the broader based mafia. Historically in Sicily  
“the state either willingly or unwillingly, although covertly, accepted and came to terms 
with such informal structures. The term mafia designates both these informal groupings 
and the connivance as such. It is only analytically that we can speak of mafia as a political 
structure. Pervading both the state and the village, it has, so to speak, its feet in each 
structure thus overarching both. Mafia is not an appendix of Sicilian society, but rather its 
very backbone” (Blok 1969: 104). 
Already in the early decades of the Mafia,4 the second half of the 19th century we 
encounter  
“a general connection between revolution, politics, and the mafia […] . What brought the 
Mafia and the politicians together was the fact that they were all in the business of 
controlling people. […] Thus, as different as revolution, politics, and crime may have been 
in theory, in Sicily the three seemed to mesh together quite nicely. […] [The Mafia; P.K.] 
emerged […] as a semiautonomous form of political control alternative to the legitimate 
control of the new Italian state” (Fentress 2000: 149-151).  
After the Allied landing on Sicily in 1943 the Mafia, which had been weakened during the 
fascist era, became “the operative arm of the allied military government (AMGOT)” 
(Orlando 2007: 39; transl. P.K.). This and the strategic decision of the Mafia bosses to 
support the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) allowed them to establish a comprehensive 
“mafia-like political system of domination” ( Orlando 2007: 39, transl. P.K.). In return the 
DC provided the protection on the national level and allowed the Mafia to enter the 
political system on the local and regional level – normally under the guise of the DC. 
Filippo Sabetti, in an excellent study on the Vilalba-Mafia points to the “growing fusion of 
the outlaw regime [the local “Mafia-government”; P.K.] with the renascent Christian 
Democracy” (Sabetti, 2002: 127). Not only in the late 19th or early 20th century, but 
likewise in the early decades after the Second World War, the Mafia cannot simply be 
conceived of as a criminal organization, but must be understood as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, which integrated a political, economic, criminal and social dimension.5 
Such a perspective “transforms into a variable what is often viewed as a constant: the 
emergence of mafia groups as illicit, criminal enterprises” (Sabetti 2002: xix).  
 
 
4  For the development of the Mafia in Sicily see Sabetti 2002, Catanzaro 1985, Blok 1969, Hess, 1988, Paoli 
2003. 
5  It is interesting to know for example, that up to 1984 in Sicily the Mafia doubled as tax-collector for the 
Italian state. Up to this year tax-collection was farmed out to a private firm owned by the Salvo cousins 
Ignazio and Nino, who “were legally entitled to a commission of up to 10 percent of the taxes they 
collected” (Gambetta 1998: 163). 
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At the core of a mafia-kinship-system are one or two biological families which extend 
outward along networks of artificial kinship systems. In order to grow, the kinship pattern 
is extended well beyond its natural limits. Crucial are godparent relationships (Catanzaro 
1985: 38). Being kinship groups, the traditional mafia organizations are also highly 
localized. The foundation of their survival is a dominant position over a well defined 
territory.  
Directly connected to the concept of kinship is instrumental friendship, which is based 
on the patron-client type of voluntary exchange of favors, instrumentalizing the norms of 
reciprocity in order to strengthen bonds of trust in a low-trust environment. In this 
context friendship “becomes an instrument for attaining goals outside the friendship 
itself.” Its essence “lies in the possibility of reciprocity in the exchange of resources, either 
one's own or acquired; in the potential continuity of such exchange; and, finally, in the 
largely open nature of the relationship” (Catanzaro 1985: 38).  
These various patterns go together in an integrated approach towards upholding local 
control. Mafia cosche as a general rule try to minimize the actual use of physical violence 
for the purpose of social control. Even though the ability to use violence is a core feature 
and “generalized ingredient of Mafioso behavior” (Gambetta 2000: 168-169), everyday 
control is normally upheld through the bonds of natural and artificial kinship. Within 
and beyond this circle control is upheld by way of dispensing favors and thereby earning 
debts of loyalty. As the Mafiosi gives benefits without asking for specific returns, the very 
“vagueness of the repayment is translated into a perpetual debt of proofs of moral 
obligation that is, of symbols and pledges of loyalty” (Catanzaro 1985: 46, see also 
Gambetta 2000: 170).  
This capacity to dispense favors is crucial for the continued domination of the Mafia 
and has to be nourished by economic activities. Historically mafia organizations thrived 
on siphoning off various types of economic rents, they extracted by virtue of the debts of 
loyalty, their control over local political positions and/or connection to party officials and 
their capability at employing violence. It would be wrong to connect the Mafia with illegal 
activities only, as many of their activities were perfectly legal. However, being “Mafia” 
obviously helped in the legal business, where Mafia entrepreneurs could rely on their 
reputation and, if necessary, selectively use “mafia methods”. Additionally the Mafia 
entrepreneurs dominated “in the local community, thanks to a strong control – in some 
cases a monopoly – of the labour market” (Paoli 1994: 224). 
The normative foundation of this practice of business and social control is a negation 
of the difference between legal and illegal behavior. The primacy of the state-focussed rule 
of law principle is substituted by an alternative principle according to which the informal 
seemingly tradition-bound cultural codes, as transmitted in and through the mafia, reign 
supreme and demand unconditional loyalty. For all practical purposes, the traditional 
Mafia groups governed their territories by providing crucial public goods which 
characterize government: security, law and public order. And for most of the time, these 
activities, while technically illegal, where not necessarily deemed illicit on the part of the 
local population.  
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It certainly helped that from the outset of the development of the mafia, some of its 
representatives entered the state as local politician or administrator. In the mid 1870s for 
example in Monreale, one small city in the hinterland of Palermo, “six of the major public 
security officials […] were noted Mafiosi. This included the commander of the rural 
guards, the commander of the suburban guards, and four captains of the National Guard” 
(Sabetti 2002: 201). For the Mafia, it especially paid to secure mayoral positions, because 
at that time they thereby could get control over the local police, whose members were 
municipal employees. Not seldom whoever was in power in a municipality “would not 
hesitate to use the police to despoil their local enemies” (Fentress 2000: 164).  
Parallel to the conquest of the local state, the Mafia later developed fully blown “outlaw 
regimes” (Sabetti 2002) at the local level that “had all the characteristics of a formal 
system of government” consisting of a council of chiefs and a military society, the 
members of the latter imposing sanctions and safeguarding public order.6 The council of 
chiefs adjudicated conflicts according to locally accepted norms and was responsible for 
developing new norms if circumstances required (Sabetti 2002: 113-115). The Councils’ 
legitimacy was quite often underwritten by the presence of the local priests. Many of these 
“outlaw regimes”, insofar as they successfully referred to locally held codes of conduct and 
norms “enjoyed the support of many, if not most, villagers, who stood to profit from it 
and did not regard state laws as the final determinant of what was criminal or illegal” 
(Sabetti 2002: xxi).  
In order to uphold his local legitimacy the Mafia boss had to pose as an altruist, a 
“profitable altruist”, someone who by helping others in the community is also able to help 
himself (Sabetti 2002: 96ff). This limited the options for repression and exploitation open 
to the local Mafia (Sabetti 2002: 127) and cognitively transformed the Mafia-boss into a 
more or less benevolent patron.  
It is important to realize that the traditional Mafia was “not a corporate social unit” 
and can only partially be understood as a kind of criminal organization. More 
importantly Mafia and Mafiosi “denote actual behavior: claiming and maintaining 
resources (land, employment, political support, and so on) through violence while 
conniving with formal authority.” Insofar Mafia should be interpreted as a peculiar social 
formation which emerged out of the interaction of a weak and mostly absent modern 
state and a semi-feudal local order (Blok 1969: 104), at the same time insulating this order 
from the ideology and practice of the modern nation state and connecting and integrating 
it into the overall framework of statism through its specific mode of governance. Fentress 
emphasizes, that the traditional Mafia “was less an economic system in itself than a form 
of political dominance” (Fentress 2000: 163). Similarly Hess argues that “Mafia is a power 
structure” (2009: 165). In order to be successful it had to “monopolise illegal violence […] 
 
 
6  For a detailed description of the authority patterns and functioning of such outlaw regimes see Sabetti 
2002: 104-118). 
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and to rule a territory” (Hess 2009: 165). Paoli supporting this interpretation argues that 
despite all its economic activities, the Mafia actually aims at “political dominion”, 
meaning the exercise of “sovereign control over the people in their communities” (Paoli 
2004: 24; see also Paoli 2001, 2003, 2007).  
2.4  Philippine politics as mafia-style behavior  
Alfred McCoy gives a clear-cut analysis of Philippine politics positing a systemic 
integration of legal and illegal, private and public actors utilizing legal and illegal means 
for upholding social control and being engaged in licit as well as illicit business as well:  
“The Republic has deputised a panoply of parastatal elements – bandits, warlords, 
smugglers, gambling bosses, militia chiefs and rebel commanders. Though many are at best 
quasi-legal and some are outright outlaws, these fragments of the state are not mere 
aberrations but are instead integral facets of an administration whose sum, in fusion with 
constitutional elements, defines the Philippine polity” (McCoy 2009a: 233).  
Those manifold fragments are granted a huge array “of informal immunities that 
inevitably shape the character of the country’s politics, fostering an array of nonstate 
actors and localized systems of social control” (McCoy 2009b: 49). Philippine “mafia-
style” politics (Sidel 1999, Sidel/Hedman 2000: 89) is based on two fundamental norms, 
guiding political practice – norms at the very heart of any form of organized crime: 
Violence is no sole prerogative of a relatively autonomous state, but can be used as a 
private instrument of social control and empowerment by any member of the ruling class 
subject only to considerations of prudence. Moreover, the boundary between legal and 
illegal is of no importance, except for the calculation of costs and benefits accrued to 
alternative strategies of action. For Philippine politics this means that the political elites 
on various political levels complement the legal use of coercion (via state security agencies 
and according to the law) with illegal violence. They also complement legal forms of 
political competition with illegal ones (from vote buying to the killing of contenders). 
Finally, they annul the functional differentiation characteristic for modern nation states 
and likewise the separation of powers, as they rely on the organizing principle of kinship 
whose members branch out into and complement each other as representatives of the 
family in different sectors (business, politics), public institutions (legislative, executive, 
judiciary, state administration), and levels of politics and economic engagement as well 
(local, provincial, national).  
On the local level, Philippine politicians quite often succeed in establishing local 
monopolies with respect to public office, franchises, public contracts, discretionary funds, 
employment opportunities and the like. These local monopolies unite on a higher level 
into an oligopoly of multidimensional control by a ruling elite. Strong competition on the 
local level translates quite easily into violence. Violence is strongest in those regions and 
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sectors where “primitive accumulation” of resources is still the mainstay of the elite 
and/or families compete for power and monopolistic control.7  
Similar to crime, the role of violence recedes with modernization of the organization 
and primitive accumulation gives way to sophisticated accumulation, that is accumulation 
which is based on the investment of capital. In more sophisticated environments and 
business contexts physical violence tends to prove to be less of a stabilizing and 
empowering, but more of a destabilizing and dysfunctional practice. The relative decrease 
of violent means is, however, not accompanied by a lessening of illegal practices. 
Irrespective of political level, acting illegally to achieve one’s aims is a perfectly normal 
pattern. It is argued in this report, that by and large in the Philippines politics and crime 
merge to a significant extent, the politician acting in a criminal fashion, the criminal 
branching out into politics either indirectly (strawman, corruption) or directly (becoming 
politician or getting members of the family elected). In the end, we find one integrated 
system in which politics and crime are indistinguishable.  
3.  The political elite as entrepreneurs in violence – from the local 
to the national level 
“People die, but I don’t know if my bullets were the ones that killed them […]. Each one has 
his own destiny. […] I chose to lead this kind of life; I am ready for its consequences.” (Luis 
Chavit Singson, Provincial Governor Ilocos Sur, cited in Torres 2003: 42). 
In the Philippines the state has been captured to a significant extent by a group quite 
similar to the mafia in social outlook, leadership style and readiness to employ violence. 
The types of violence employed fit quite neatly. Firstly, there is vertical violence against 
individuals and representatives of groups who dare to challenge the social order and 
status quo of domination. Secondly, there is horizontal violence amongst the various 
families competing for power.  
I will first give a short overview over the genesis of politico-criminal violence in the 
Philippines, and then I will turn to their role in the context of intra-elite competition, 
followed by a short discussion of the role of private armed groups, before turning to an 
analysis of violence against contenders of the dominant order. Finally with the strong 
 
 
7  Primitive accumulation harks back on theories of the development of capitalism through the 
differentiation of a capitalist and a propertyless proletarian class. Primitive accumulation is the external 
starting point which brings capitalisms core, capital, into being. Marx was the first to point out, that this 
primitive or original accumulation rests not so much on diligence and hard work on the part of a small 
segment of the population but on resource extraction, plunder, enslavement and forcible eviction of the 
weaker ones. Through these processes rural producers were driven either from the countryside into the 
factories or degraded into landless agricultural laborers. Primitive accumulation, however, should not be 
interpreted only as a temporal phenomenon during the early stages of capitalism, but as “a continuous 
phenomenon within the capitalist mode of production” (De Angelis 2001: 1). 
Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime 11 
 
 
patron, a cultural model will be presented, which informs the everyday acceptance of 
privatized forms of political violence.  
3.1  The genesis of Philippine political violence  
Violent actors employed by local politicians, landlords or business-magnates have been 
an enduring phenomenon in the Philippines. The late 19th and early 20th century saw the 
development of a new social class, quite similar to the traditional Sicilian Mafia in the 
core regions of agricultural production of the Philippines. These men started out as 
overseers and armed guards of the local and mostly absent landlords, to become a class of 
entrepreneurs in violence and votes of their own. Their initially one-sided dependency on 
their landlords eventually changed into a complex and much more balanced relationship 
in which the two sides traded votes for pork-barrel funds and protection. The first 
generations of these overseers originated from the peasantry, but had a local reputation 
for toughness and were therefore seen as real or efficacious men (magaling na lalaki). On 
this basis they were then chosen by the landlords to protect their interests and “control 
and intimidate potential lower-class leaders” (Fegan 1994: 45). Overseers successfully 
upheld local order establishing a hierarchical and wide-spread network (Fegan 1994: 38). 
In order to get their way and protect their patron’s interest they used a “combination of 
force, terror, and bribery”. They not only amassed power, but eventually were able to turn 
power into local authority, either informally or formally through the barangay.8 
Eventually these men became crucial mediators who settled local disputes, even 
homicides, outside the law, fixed local politics and helped the local population in a 
multitude of concerns. They perceived themselves as “men of honor” (citations: Fegan 
1994: 39). These men turned into specific strata of power brokers at the local level, 
employing violence in order to achieve their aims.  
Violence, however, was not the only illegal activity of these groups. Of similar 
importance were their activities as smugglers and local gambling-lords, who ran various 
types of illegal number games. The rents captured via these enterprises were then utilized 
to a significant degree to bribe underpaid officials and public servants (Fegan 1994: 37), 
thereby providing loyal clients downwardly and attentive patrons upwardly. All of this 
resulted in a regime of multi-dimensional local control by just one group, which annulled 
any constitutional or legal divisions of authority within their respective bailiwicks. Even 
though most of these local power-brokers remained at the lower rungs of Philippine 
 
 
8  The barangay, formerly denoted barrio is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines, which is 
subdivided in about 42,000 barangays. Each barangay is led by a barangay captain and seven barangay 
councillors, all of which are elected every three years. The barangay also encompasses the lowest rung of 
the Philippine Justice system, which aims at mediating and conciliating disputes, so that the formal legal 
system is disburdened.  
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politics, a number of them made it to higher levels, representing an important avenue for 
social mobility.  
Even though individual “boss-qualities” are crucial, they are not sufficient for success, 
as individual strength and reach have to be broadened and extended over time, a process 
which is inconceivable without a strong network. This network is built upon the basis of 
real or imagined kinship ties. As imagined families are the building blocks of the local as 
well as the superordinate levels of politics with the state-institutions as an empty shell, 
populated by bosses and political families, “Filipinos act as if the state is not an abstract 
set of anonymous functionaries but a loose alliance of individuals who have gained office 
by political favoritism and have their own individual interests, allies, and enemies. In that 
context, the populace looks to self-help and political negotiation as the only reliable 
sources of security and assistance” (Fegan 1994: 50). Leaders have to deliver protection 
and benefits from the superordinate political levels in order to prevent defection. Both of 
these tasks demand “that the leaders have a credible ability to use armed force” (Fegan 
1994: 50).  
3.2  Horizontal political violence from the barangay to the province 
Political violence pervades the whole political system of the Philippines, most often on or 
below the municipal level but also upwards to the provincial level, when governors or 
congressmen secure their power with violent means.  
An extreme contemporary example would be the Ampatuan clan under its leader 
Andal Ampatuan Sr. In the Muslim regions of the southern Philippine main island of 
Maguindanao this family rose to power through violence in the 1990s expanding this 
power through violence during the last decade. In the course of these developments the 
clan built-up a private army of between 2,000 and 3,000 men and probably killed several 
hundred people, who were in their way. One interview-partner, a Mindanaoan politician, 
in January 2010 characterized the clan and its leader in terms, which closely resemble 
descriptions of the most feared Mafia families and bosses: 
“The first option always of the Ampatuan in their political strategies was killing. […] That is 
the first option. […] Lateron, […] when they became richer, then they had more tools. 
Money, influence and the option to kill receded. But it's always been in the background. The 
option to kill was always there before. So that is why Ampatuans’ thinking was killing. 
Because that has always been the default. That's how they projected themselves: You get in 
our way, we kill you. And for those in the lower strata the option was always killing. So 
killing came naturally. If you were not armed, you did not have your own clan to protect 
yourself, you were just an ordinary guy, then the option was always default, was killing” 
(Interview Manila 2010). 
The leader of the clan, Andal Ampatuan senior, has a reputation as a ruthless politician. 
According to various sources, he even killed three of his relatives whom he perceived to 
be threats to his rise to the top position within the clan (Piñol 2009a; interview Manila, 
9.2.2010). Manny Piñol, three time governor of North Cotabato province, adjacent to the 
core areas of the Ampatuan clan in Maguindanao, describes how Andal Ampatuan a few 
years ago offered him 5 Million pesos (~ 100,000 US$) to find and hand over one person 
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that had dared to run for mayor against the will of the clan. He likewise talks about people 
“being placed in cement mixers before they were buried alive” (Piñol 2009a). For more 
than a decade the state did not react to the violence perpetrated by the Clan as the 
Ampatuan family was time and again able to deliver the necessary votes for the president 
and various senators to win their elections.  
This hands-off policy changed only in the wake of the Maguindanao massacre of 
November 23, 2009. On this day a political rival of the Ampatuans wanted to deliver his 
certificate of candidacy for the position of provincial governor in the 2010 elections. 
However, being afraid of being assaulted he sent a number of female members of the 
family, believing that these would not be attacked. They were accompanied by 30 
journalists. Upon reaching the town of Ampatuan, the convoy was stopped by up to 200 
armed men, presumably under the leadership of the mayor, Andal Ampatuan Jr., who was 
the Ampatuan candidate for governor. What followed was a killings spree, which none of 
the members of the convoy survived.  
More than the massacre itself, in which not only members of the Ampatuans’ private 
army, but also local police auxiliary forces and policemen took part, do its antecedents and 
aftermath illustrate the relative autonomy of family control over specific core territories.  
Esmael Mangudadatu, mayor of the town of Buluan in Maguindanao, and long-time 
political ally of the Ampatuan-clan made public in early 2009 that he would run for 
governor of Maguindanao and thereby challenge the dominant family, who thought the 
position to be theirs. When he insisted on running, Gilberto Theodoro, then Secretary of 
National Defense, asked him to think again, as “the Ampatuans have the tendency to be 
violent”, adding according to the testimony of Mangudadatu that “I’m just concerned 
about your safety because your rivals have a violent streak.” Other high government 
representatives tried to dissuade Mangudadatu from running pointing out that he should 
be very careful (The Philippine Star 28.1.2010: 8). Theodoro’s and the others’ counsel 
show that the Philippine state did not try to enforce the rule of law and safeguard the 
contenders’ right to stand for election, but instead obviously accepted the alternative 
frame of reference, in which local powerholders are expected and accepted to resort to 
violence if their core interests are threatened. Putting it into a medieval or Mafia-context 
one Maguindanaoan interview partner argued that  
“the national government was saying ‘Don't run anymore, don't run anymore’. Because that 
upsets the order, that they had set up. But they could not in an ostensibly democratic 
society with democratic space, they could not just tell him not to run. They were still behind 
Ampatuan, they knew that Ampatuan will crush him. But for Ampatuan the social practice 
was "You don't challenge the lord". So he took it very personally” (Interview Manila 2010).9 
 
 
9  This respect for territorial jurisdiction is likewise a core segment of the Mafia-culture. So for example in 
an early report of 1900, the police chief of Palermo pointed out, that “among the canons of the mafia there 
is one regarding the respect for the territorial jurisdiction of other [cosche]. The infraction of this canon 
constitutes a personal insult” (cited in Fentress 2000: 177).  
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For the state the killing became a problem only because it exceeded by far the limits of 
accepted intra-elite violence, as not only the contender and a small number of his 
bodyguards were killed; but killed were his wife and several other female relatives together 
with 30 journalists. As one interviewee told the author in January 2010, if Ampatuan  
“had just pressured or if he had done his killing underground as assassination, then it would 
be fine. Perfectly fine, it would be in a Renaissance context, a Machiavellian world. Right 
and that would be perfectly fine for the political class here” (Interview Manila 2010).  
By killing and mutilating women and many journalists the “rules of engagement” 
governing local political competition had been broken, threatening an unlimited “war” 
amongst contending segments of the political elite. And it is here, that the state comes in, 
not enforcing the rule of law and punishing those overstepping the legal boundaries, but 
largely aiming at the mediation and facilitation of inter-family wars, if these threaten to 
spiral out of control.10  
How careful the state actually is, is illustrated by the immediate aftermath of the 
Maguindanao massacre, when Secretary Jesus Dureza, the Presidential Assistant for 
Mindanao, arrived on site. After talking to the Mangudadatu family and convincing them 
not to take retaliatory action, he proceeded to the Ampatuan family. As he disclosed  
“With my staff and without military escorts, except for one military officer, Col Macario as 
guide, I motored to the Ampatuan residence. […] I entered the Ampatuan fenced premises 
and the patriarch Gov. Andal Ampatuan, Sr. was there waiting for me. […] Armed 
followers were everywhere.”  
With time ongoing Dureza became “worried that darkness would overtake my return trip 
[…]. Many armed and uniformed men on the highway. One could not tell what group or 
unit.” After Andal Jr., the suspected leader of the attack, promised to cooperate, Dureza 
left for a nearby City for the night. After some further negotiation the family surrendered 
Andal Ampatuan Jr. voluntarily. When Dureza arrived by helicopter the next day to fetch 
the suspect, the helicopter’s “engines were not shut off as agreed in case a sudden exit 
manoeuvre was necessary” (all citations: Dureza 2009). On their way back with the 
suspect Andal Ampatuan Jr. the helicopter was shot at, the gunners on board retorting 
fire.  
Dureza’s discomfort and dread are clearly visible in his account, which neatly fits the 
“state’s” action before the massacre: accepting local overlordship of certain families and 
negotiating with them for cooperation. On the territory controlled by the Ampatuan 
family Dureza was no more than a guest, who could only hope that the right to hospitality 
was not denied to him. Dureza’s reaction, put on record in his own writing, makes 
abundantly clear, that at least in certain regions “the state” is no undisputed superior 
 
 
10  Whereas “the state” tried avert a major local war between the Ampatuan and the Mangudadatu-families 
by promising the latter swift state action and support in the elections, it stood back, when a few weeks 
after the massacre the bodyguards of Esmail Mangudadatu shot and killed an unarmed henchmen of the 
Ampatuans, who happened to run into them in a shopping-mall (see for example: Mindanews 2010).  
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force, but only one party to a bargaining process between competitors of near equal 
strength.  
After eight months the trial of Andal Ampatuan Jr. is still in its initial phases. All other 
family members have in the meantime been largely exonerated from complicity, witnesses 
were killed or disappeared, 11 so chances are good that finally there will be an acquittal for 
lack of evidence – at the very least, the fallout of the massacre will be reduced to one 
member of the clan and insignificant followers. Even though the political position of the 
family has been weakened, they still provide several dozen local executives in control of 
their core region and are still the strongest political clan nationwide, if measured by 
number of political positions only. 
Even though this case stands out in modern Philippine history other cases of violence 
abound, which do not make much headlines because they follow the pattern which is 
“perfectly fine for the political class”: the assassination of the competitor (with probably 
some “collateral damage” on the part of his bodyguards).  
Official police data give 95 attacks on elective officials from June 2009 to early March 
2010 with 102 victims of whom 65 were killed (Philippine Star 2010a). The first few 
months of the year 2009 (from Jan. 1 to May 20), when there was no upcoming election, 
brought 52 shooting incidents victimizing local elective officials, of which 30 resulted in 
one or more deaths (Inquirer.net 2009).12 In most of these and similar cases it is rumored 
that members of the political elite on the local or provincial level employ either private 
armed groups, contract killers or members of the state security institutions. This applies 
to the police and Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVO), over which the local 
executives have operational control, but also the Armed Forces of the Philippines. A 
knowledgeable person told the author that  
“there are many instances when the local politicians can apply pressure on an officer, 
because most of our officers seek clearances from different government agencies […] and a 
simple call from a local politician to another government official would already set some 
things in motion which could well affect the career or even the family of some officers”.  
Asked in how far a local military commander could be of help to a local politician, the 
same person, argued that “It’s the three Gs to project themselves in power: goons, guns 
 
 
11  In one case one self-confessed gunman was killed because he failed to secure government protection 
(GMANews.tv 2010). In other cases a close relative and two others connected to the family of two core 
witnesses were killed and the brother of one suspect-turned-witness was severely wounded after being 
shot multiple times (HRW 2010). 
12  The victims are normally local officials, however, sometimes national politicians get killed too. So, for 
example, the Congressman for Abra, Luis Bersamin, whose killing in 2006 was ordered by the then 
Governor of the province, Vicente Valera and Wahab Akbar, representative for Basilan, whose killing in 
2007 seems to have been ordered by his competitor Gerry Salapuddin. The Governor of Sulu, Sakur Tan 
escaped narrowly, when a bomb exploded next to him in early August 2010 at Zamboanga airport, killing 
the bomber and a bystander.  
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and gold. And we can provide two of these: the goons and the guns” (Interview Manila 
2010). 
3.3  Private armed groups  
At any time in modern Philippine history, a large number of politicians employed the 
services of variously termed private armies, private or partisan armed groups (PAG), 
made private use of state security forces, hired contract killers or made use of prisoners. 
Already in the 1949 elections in Cavite, south of Manila, the local governor organized 
groups of armed men to coerce the local population to vote for him and his slate of 
candidates. “For this purpose the most notorious characters in the town were drafted as 
members of Special Police Force, which usually was under the command and control of 
the Chief of Police of the town” (House Electoral Tribunal Decision 1952, cited in Sidel 
1999: 109). In 2001, more than 50 years later, the Philippine Daily Inquirer presented, what 
he supposed to be the work of similar PAGs during the election campaign of that year:  
“As the elections draw near, the PAGs are expected to either harass their principals’ rivals 
or engage in criminal activities to raise campaign funds […]. The activities include 
kidnapping-for-ransom, robbery-holdup, extortion and drug-trafficking. Police said, that 
[…] penal farm inmates were allegedly being “utilized” for illegal partisan operations. One 
of the more prominent names on the list […] allegedly keeps a group of 15 members, four 
of whom had been linked to murder and homicide cases, who are armed with three 
Armalite rifles and 16 short firearms” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 19.3.2001: 1+18).  
Compare this to the year 2010, when the Chief of the Philippine National Police, Jesus 
Verzosa, disclosed that politicians actually connive with prison personnel in organizing 
prisoners as private armies. As Verzosa explained: “The inmates are not only used as 
‘hired goons’ by politicians to kill their rivals, they are also utilized in kidnapping 
activities and other criminal acts.”13  
There have been various countings of private armed groups in the services of 
politicians. In 1971, probably the first ever “official” counting produced 80 so-called 
private armies, six of which were maintained by Senators, 37 by Congressmen and the rest 
by governors, mayors or relatives to powerful politicians (Philippines Free Press 
14.11.1970, 1). The actual number of PAGs was probably much higher, as in 1970 a huge 
number of de facto private armies were legalized by registering them as security agencies. 
Within only 44 days, 315 new private security agencies were registered, the total number 
more than doubled from 192 to 507. Many of the newly registered ones were owned by 
relatives of political warlords (Tutay 1971).14 So it might be argued that these 315 
 
 
13  Philippine Daily Inquirer 2010. 
14  Then as now, the actual numbers probably are much higher, as many politicians and business firms 
employ members of state institutions like the police, the Civilian Volunteer Organization or special 
CAFGU units for private purposes. These, however, are not included in the various lists of private armed 
groups.  
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“security agencies” actually should be included in the number of private armies. A few 
years after the return to democracy in 1986 the official number stood “at 562 private 
armies with almost 24,000 men and 11,000 firearms (Echeverria 2010: 6). While the 
numbers officially went down to a few dozen armed groups in the following years, for the 
year 2001 around 100 private armies are reported which were said to be responsible for 80 
percent of election-related violence in the same year (Trillanes 2008). In a confidential 
report it was said that these armed groups were controlled amongst others by at least 
three former and incumbent congressmen, four provincial governors and 15 mayors 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer 19.3.2001: 1). In 2004 the police reported at least 78 private 
armed groups and in early 2010 the number stood at 132 (Philippine Daily Inquirer 
5.52004: 20; Echeverria 2010, see also Verzosa 2010).  
The size of private armed forces goes from the single gun-for-hire, or a lone local 
ruffian over a small number of outright illegal or formally legal forces up to veritable 
armies encompassing several hundred heavily armed men, the latter clearly being the 
exception.  
3.4  Vertical violence against challengers of the dominant order 
In the Philippines the ruling order is challenged by a number of groups, from the various 
armed revolutionary movements over left-leaning union activists to farmers’ rights 
movements that for more than two decades try to push through land-reform, anti-logging 
movements and local organizations campaigning against mining business, journalists 
who try to investigate and publicize the illegal activities of politicians and businessmen to 
judges and lawyers, who cannot be bought. All of them are threatened by the violence 
emanating from the political elite, even though only one group, the armed revolutionary 
movements, employs violence itself. The violence against the latter is generally not so 
much the product of local private armed groups or hired killers, but emanates from the 
Armed Forces and its auxiliaries (CAFGUs), which are used in this openly political 
context, where any resistance against the ruling order is defined as insurgency and dealt 
with in the context of a holistic, violence based counterinsurgency strategy. Other types of 
killings are more often associated with private armed goons, death squads or contract 
killers, that are said to be answerable to local politicians. 
As hardly any case of extrajudicial execution or assassinations is solved, much of the 
violence is shrouded in mystery. However, the last few years have brought forward a 
significant number of studies, amongst them one scathing report of Philipp Alston, the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of the United 
Nations, (2008), who concluded that  
“there have been many extrajudicial executions of leftist activists in the Philippines. These 
killings have eliminated civil society leaders, including human rights defenders, trade 
unionists and land reform advocates, intimidated a vast number of civil society actors, and 
narrowed the country’s political discourse” (Alston 2008: 2).  
According to Karapatan, a left leaning human rights organization, from January 2001 to 
March 2010 more than 1,000 persons, most of them political activists, were victimized in 
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the context of extrajudicial killings and summary or arbitrary executions. In the same 
timespan more than 200 people disappeared. In both cases the largest number of victims 
are found in the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions, both on the Island of 
Luzon (Karapatan 2009: 1f; see also Karapatan 2010). Even though Karapatan probably 
bloats the numbers, the gist of the message is beyond doubt.  
The dramatic situation with respect to this type of vertical, repressive violence is 
corroborated by the high number of journalists killed during the last decade. According 
to the data provided by the National Union of Journalists from 1986 to May 2010 137 
journalists were killed (http://www.nujp.org/), most of them (100) under the Arroyo-
Macapagal presidency since 2001. In the same time span 15 judges and 26 lawyers have 
been killed according to the National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL 2010). As if to 
test the resolve of the newly inaugurated president Aquino, in the first three weeks of his 
administration from July 1 to 23 2010, it is said that six activists were killed and one local 
journalist severely wounded (ANN 2010).  
While most of the killings of political activists probably is the handiwork of the armed 
forces, politicians, judges and lawyers are said to become mostly victims because of their 
current work, which almost always focuses on illegal activities of local politicians. 
Accordingly it stands to reason that the assassinations are carried out by contract-killers. 
Sometimes even members of the police might step in to lend a helping hand, as probably 
in the case of the murder of the journalist Salvador Dacer in 2000. For ordering this 
killing the then head of the PNP and the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force 
under President Estrada and later Sentator, Panfilo “Ping” Lacson, was officially charged 
in January 2010. According to a sworn statement he had ordered a former police officer to 
kill Dacer and a former Chief Superintendent of the PNP (Requejo 2010 ). However, a few 
days before the arrest warrant was issued Senator Lacson fled the country to evade arrest 
(The Philippine Star 3.2.2010: p. 1+4). At other times he had already been connected to 
drug-trading, kidnapping for ransom and the ordering of extrajudicial executions.15  
3.5 The strong patron as a role model 
As could be seen, violence is a crucial ingredient of political rule in the Philippines. And 
even though the vertical violence against leftists, social activists and human rights 
defenders resembles the violent strategies of many authoritarian states, in the Philippines 
this latter vertical violence has to be seen in the context of the corresponding type of 
horizontal violence, which rages mostly between segments of the elite from the lowest to 
the highest levels. Even though quantitative data does not exist, it can be argued that the 
actual level of vertical violence corresponds to the horizontal one. Both types of violence 
 
 
15  See for example the sworn affidavit of Danny Devnani, who later was ambushed, but survived, printed in: 
Philippine Star, 8.9.2003.  
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fit the model of a mafia-type polity. Whereas the first, similar to the clan-wars in the 
Mafia, are about territorial political and economic control against competitors, that 
belong to the same ruling class, the second type of violence is directed against competitors 
who question or put into doubt the type of rule itself. Both strategies deny entry into the 
ranks of the elite to persons or groups that do not follow the dominant pattern of political 
domination based partially on autonomous capacities at violent coercion. Similar to the 
Mafia, the perpetual threat of inter-family violence functions as a gatekeeper, preventing 
reform-oriented groups to enter the arena in the first place. In a Mafia-environment, 
alternative modes of governance are disenabled if necessary by the superior assertiveness 
of an “outlaw-regime” undergirded by family-controlled violence.  
This is especially so, as long as this type of governance is compatible with the 
dominant local cultural codes of leadership. The readiness to use violence for furthering 
private interests and upholding the status quo does not worsen the image of the 
powerholder, but quite to the contrary strengthens it. Even though for example Filipino 
politicians will deny any connections to specific crimes, they do not shy away of 
portraying themselves as strongmen, who know how to use violence. Long-time mayor of 
Davao-City and presidential security adviser Rodrigo Duterte, consciously displays the 
image of a strongman, who is not beyond violence. Even though he consistently denies 
being the invisible hand behind the death squad to which several hundred killings of 
criminal suspects have been attributed,16 he openly states that he hates criminals and 
threatens them with death. Luis Chavit Singson, who controls Ilocos Sur politics since 
1971, openly states that:  
“If someone is a bad person, he should be killed. Killing a criminal is not a sin. What is 
wrong is if you kill just anybody.” (Singson cited in Torres 2003: 47).  
Similar, the above mentioned ex-national Police chief Panfilo Lacson actually was elected 
senator on the basis of his image as a “Dirty Harry”-style policeman. Despite numerous 
long-standing accusations, he came in 10th in the Senatorial elections of 2001 and 
regained his mandate in 2007 with the third-highest number of votes nationwide. The 
terms Mafioso and the Filipino real man (magaling na lalaki) refer to a rather similar role: 
“to the actions and sentiments of incumbents of distinct positions of […] power involving 
the private use of violence” (Blok 1969: 104).  
 
 
16  In 2008 according to reports 269 persons are said to have been killed by the Davao Death Squad 
(www.preda.org/main/archives/research/digest/digest147.html). Human rights Watch gives significantly 
lower numbers, however, these still stand at 124 for the year 2008 and 814 for the time from mid 1998 to 
February 2009 (HRW 2009: 18-19).  
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4.  Peace-pacts as a representation of the right to self-help in the 
political sphere 
“We are optimistic that this peace pact […] will ensure order in the electoral exercise in 
Masbate even beyond this year’s elections” (PNP Chief Superintendent Leonardo Espina 
cited in Inquirer.net 2010). 
Like in other democracies, Filipino politicians have no right to use violence in the context 
of elections, neither are they authorized to falsify election results or buy votes. Despite 
these existing regulations, it is increasingly common that competing candidates come 
together, accompanied by representatives from the police, the armed forces, the church 
and the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in the context of elaborate ritual, to sign a 
covenant in which they solemnly promise to abstain from exactly these practices, which 
are already illegal according to state law.  
Early documented cases of such a “peace pacts” relate to the elections of 1953 and 
1961, when the leading presidential candidates signed a pact, according to which they 
would actively help “bring about clean, free and orderly elections (Philippines Free Press 
4.11.1961, 7), In 1961 the contenders for the position of Cavite Congressman Justiniano 
Montano and Fernando Campos met with the Philippine Constabulary (PC) commander 
of Cavite for a similar objective. (Philippines Free Press 4.11.1961: 6+7). Even though 
both sides agreed to surrender the firearms in the hands of their followers, both camps 
eventually deployed hundreds of partisan armed personnel on election day. (Sidel 1994: 
138).  
A few years later in Cavite the elections of 1965 resulted in a fierce gun battle between 
the forces of the liberal party candidates from the 1st and 2nd district, which left 7 people 
dead and several wounded. In the aftermath of the shoot-out the two main protagonists 
were supposed to meet in a peace conference, but only one side appeared. (Philippines 
Free Press 30.10.1965: 90). Eventually nothing came out of this effort at disarmament 
initiated by the Comelec. Both sides maintained their several hundred armed followers 
each. In the elections of 1969 even the president intervened in the province of Ilocos 
Norte, and got the opponents to stop the killing, but “the moment the President’s back 
was turned, violence erupted anew” (Philippines Free Press 2211.1969: 61). 
The policy of signing peace pacts in order to forestall violence continued in all 
elections after the Philippines returned to democracy in 1986. At times it was a reaction to 
ongoing violence, as in the 1988 elections in Pampanga, where concerned citizens, the 
Comelec and the Armed Forces united in bringing about a pact between political rivals, 
after two mayoralty candidates had been killed within a few days (Manila Standard 
17.12.1987: 15). In other cases peace pacts were signed as a preventive measure in regions 
renowned for high levels of election violence. Over time the numbers of pacts and 
participating politicians rose significantly. In 1995 the province of Pampanga already 
witnessed the signing of a peace pact in which about 300 of the total number of slightly 
more than 1,000 candidates running for office in the province participated (Manila 
Standard 22.4.1995: 4). In 2004 the government tried to solicitate peace pacts in at least 
“500 areas tagged as hot spots to prevent further bloodshed” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 
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5.5.2005: 1), and the 2007 and 2010 elections likewise brought forward a flurry of peace 
pacts on the local as well as the national level. 
Even though peace pacts have become an almost universal feature of Philippine 
politics in election years, there has been no decline in election violence. This points to the 
possibility that peace pacts seem quite often to have been signed without the intention of 
honouring them – a strong indication that such semi-traditional strategies of countering 
violence have severe limitations.  
These peace pacts are of interest in the context of an analysis of Philippine politics as a 
Mafia style endeavour, because of their paradoxical message: They actually confirm the 
political elite’s right to decide autonomously on the use of violence in the context of 
political competition. It is exactly in the course of such peace pacts, that the claims of the 
participating politicians or political families are affirmed. A policy relying on peace pacts 
to forestall political violence illustrates that the core personnel of the political system, the 
mainstream-politicians themselves, do not submit to the laws of the state, but reserve to 
themselves the right to either voluntarily sign or turn down a commitment to the formal 
rules of the game which prohibit violence, harassment and vote-rigging. By signing or 
refusing to sign such a pact, which excludes illegal means of gaining an advantage in an 
election, the fundamental autonomy of the actors to decide on this question is 
symbolically confirmed, insofar as an actor can only wilfully forego illegal means and 
strategies, if he is endowed with the legitimacy to employ them in the first place. The 
peace pacts are a confirmation of the primacy of informal law before state-law. In the 
ceremonies themselves as well as in the execution of the peace pacts, the state is in a weak, 
subordinate position. In the ceremony, his representatives “witness” the signing of the 
pact by the semi-sovereign competing politicians, and treaty-abidance does not rest on 
the enforcement capabilities of the state, but on the voluntary acknowledgement of the 
competing parties, who, with their signature do not subject themselves to the rule of law, 
but to a code of honour at best.  
5.  Politicians and illicit business ventures – the example of Jueteng 
“Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in 
high places which have shaken its very foundation.” (Sandiganbanyan – Philippine Court of 
Appeals: 2007). 
On 10 May 2010 Lilia “Baby” Pineda, three-term mayor of Lubao in the province of 
Pampanga won the competition for the governorship of this province with 66 percent of 
the votes; her running mate secured the position of vice-governor with 60 percent. The 
second congressional district was won by Pineda’s close ally and kumadre (godmother) of 
her only son, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Pineda’s son Dennis, her 
successor in the office of mayor of Lubao and president of the provincial mayors’ league 
had already declared in June 2009 that “there is no need for President Arroyo to 
campaign. We will give her an overwhelming mandate if she decides to seek a 
congressional seat” (Philippine Star 2009). With this assurance nothing could go wrong 
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for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who knew, that the Pinedas helped, wherever they could, as 
they had done before in the elections of 2004, when Lilia’s husband Rodolfo “Bong” 
Pineda is said to have given at least Three Hundred Million Pesos to support President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s success in the elections. He also said that he plays a vital role 
in the elections” (Mendoza 2005: 2). These were the very elections which are said to have 
been won by President Arroyo through large-scale fraud. “Bong” Pineda, is widely known 
as one of the most powerful Jueteng lords, or in the words of his wife’s predecessor as 
governor, as the “Jueteng Vatican” (Governor Panlilio 2008 cited in: GMANews.tv 2008).  
Jueteng is a most popular but illegal numbers game, where the gambler selects two 
numbers from 1 through 37. Then winning numbers are determined by drawing a pair of 
numbers from two sets of numbered balls. Even though there are no limits on maximum 
bets, the vast majority of bets are small scale, well below 1 US$. However, as drawings are 
up to three times a day, for the poorer segments of the population, Jueteng can result in 
financial ruin. Despite being illegal, it is one of the crucial legs of political and public 
finance beyond the state purse. The Jueteng-operators not seldom substitute for the 
“departments of social welfare and of public works in many towns and provinces, 
considering the amount of money they pour into community projects such as artesian 
wells, basketball courts, and roads, as well as the doleouts they give to almost anyone who 
approaches them for financial help. This then gives jueteng bosses a deep well of goodwill 
into which the politicians they deem worthy of their time and attention (among other 
things) can also dip and use to help propel themselves into public office” (Orejas 2007). 
So Jueteng can be analyzed pars pro toto as one crucial criminal denominator of politics 
and governance. 
5.1  Jueteng as a criminal denominator of politics and governance 
Pineda is said to control this game in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, Cavite and 
Bataan on the island of Luzon (Coronel 2000). His father is said to have operated a 
Spanish card game, called Monte and Pineda himself seems to have started as an overseer 
of the Monte-operations of a Pampanga Congressman in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Despite being widely known as a gambling lord, Pineda enjoys a perfect patronal image in 
his home-base. Bong Pineda “was able to build a reputation for legendary generosity. […] 
On Christmas Day, the Pineda mansion is opened for gift-giving, with poor people lining 
up by the thousands to avail themselves of packages of food.” Lilia Pineda is variously 
called “mother of perpetual help”, “Nanay Baby” (mother baby), who helped “hundreds of 
people ill with cancer or with psychological problems, and also provided shelter for many 
abused women and children” (Orejas 2007).  
Already the Spanish grappled with the problem of games of chance, on the one hand 
aiming at their eradication and on the other profiting from their returns. The highest 
profit for the local politicians and administrators could be gained if the games were illegal, 
because then it was not the state that profited (via a gambling tax for example), but the 
individual politician or policeman, who provided protection for the business. 
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Consequently Jueteng is kept illegal and local elites can profit on a private basis. As a 
Congressman criticized in 2005:  
“We all know since time immemorial that there are three players in the game of jueteng, 
those operating it, local government unit [LGU; P.K.] and the police. Some say that if the 
LGU and the police will only cooperate with each other, it is easy to stop the illegal numbers 
game.”17  
At the same time, to soothe the Catholic conscience, there has been an ongoing debate for 
decades on the vicissitudes of the vice and the need for a comprehensive struggle against it.  
However, as already hinted at, Jueteng profits are used not only for private gain by 
politicians, but likewise constitute one more or less crucial segment of “public” finance 
and thereby bolster the patronage structure of politics and crime. Jueteng money is used 
to “finance local social safety nets, maintain local media as retainers, and keep local clergy 
in tow.”18 A former president of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines estimated 
that about 80 percent of local politicians elected, won their elections “primarily or largely 
with the help of jueteng money” (cited in: Go 2003a: 111). Accusations of either profiting 
from Jueteng or actively running Jueteng rackets were brought by the police and others 
against provincial governors, municipal mayors, barangay captains, but also police 
officers among others (see for example Coronel 2000, Conde 2003, Fabella 2006).  
In the late 1990s it is said, that in one province, Ilocos Sur, the bribery rates were “P1 
million for the regional PNP director; P500,000 for the provincial police chief; P150,000 
for the local congressman; and P7,500 to P30,000 for the municipal police chief, 
depending on the size of the town” (Coronel 2000).19 For Luzon it was estimated at a gross 
profit of nearly 1 billion US$ of which 180 million US$ were said to be used to bribe the 
police and politicians (McCoy 2009, 226).  
Whereas traditionally Jueteng-operators and politicians were in a symbiotic 
relationship, the past decade brought reports that rumored Jueteng-operators venture into 
politics or finance the campaigns of members of the family. Miriam Go, paraphrasing an 
interview with a Jueteng operator who succeeded in becoming a politician, points out that 
as Jueteng-operator he could not only depend on the absolute loyalty of all those people 
working for his Jueteng business, but could also fall back on the aid of the local police, 
military and the local clergy, as all of them profited from various types of kickbacks (Go 
2003a: 100).  
 
 
17  Rep. Amado Espino Jr. in Congress 2005 cited in: the Official Government Portal of the Republic of the 
Philippines 13.6.2005. 
18  Fabella 2007: 109.  
19  For more data on the sharing-rates of jueteng profits see for example PCIJ/IPD 1995, Tan 2003. The 
police director’s 1 Million US$ were equivalent to about 26,000 US$, the municipal police chief’s share 
would be between 200 and 800 US$.  
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The police are in a paradoxical situation with respect to Jueteng. Whereas in official 
political rhetoric Jueteng is demonized and its eradication is said to be a top priority, on a 
practical basis it provides significant and indispensable funds to politicians and police 
alike, without which neither can do well: “jueteng bribe money, […] also goes to town 
mayors, supplements the mayor’s assistance fund-for the poor person’s burial, for the 
construction of a basketball court, for a family’s unpaid electricity bill. In the same 
manner […] jueteng bribe money augments a police station’s “MOOE”, or Maintenance 
and Other Operation Expenses.20 Additionally local police at the grassroots-level are also 
regularly bribed with small amounts of money or free “night-outs” (PCIJ/IPD 1995).21 
Jueteng also provides a significant number of jobs for the rural and especially the urban 
poor. It has been estimated, that in each municipality there are about 1,000 collectors, 
making their rounds in the neighborhoods, taking the bets and disbursing the gains. In a 
middle sized province with 20 municipalities this means that there are at least 20,000 
people employed in this industry (Tan 2003: 65). On a nation-wide level the Jueteng-
industry is said to employ about 400,000 workers (McCoy 2009: 226). All those people 
together with their family-members will vote for whomever the Jueteng operator might 
decide to support. Additionally they function like a free campaign aid for the respective 
politician (PCIJ/IPD 1995).  
Jueteng is especially important, as either the direct profits of the operator or the 
kickbacks received by local politicians, police commanders and others enable these to 
build up and uphold their patronage networks, which are essential in the quest for power 
and profit. Jueteng lords and local politicians who can access Jueteng funds set aside a 
certain amount of money, which they then use to dispense charity and social welfare to 
the needy, guaranteeing that all of them become and remain bound in so-called utang na 
loob relationships. (Go 2003a). These debts of gratitude (utang na loob) create and 
stabilize vertical bonds between superiors and inferiors, the first providing commodities 
with a specific financial value, which are cognitively categorized as gifts or favors which 
need to be returned. Whereas in the majority of exchanges the superior provides gifts of 
concrete monetary value, the inferior reciprocates with returns which cannot easily be 
measured in this currency. Culturally and psychologically the relation established by the 
first “gift” indebts him perpetually, with only slight chances of ever clearing his debt. The 
very vagueness of repayment translates into moral obligation, which time and again has to 
be symbolically reconfirmed by the debtor through pledges of loyalty (Mayer 1980: 56-
58). One such pledge may be the willingness to vote for any politician the superior partner 
of the relationship proposes. Therefore, through the provision of a certain amount of 
money to a number of clients, the Jueteng lord then can sell their votes to the highest 
bidder in future elections and politicians can create a stable pool of votes for themselves 
 
 
20  Tan 2003: 64; see also PCIJ/IPD 1995.  
21  The consequence of this double-bind is a practice wherein police raids of Jueteng operations are stage-
managed in cooperation with both local politicians and Jueteng-operators (Tan 2003; Go 2003). 
Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime 25 
 
 
or family-members. As the language is one of gift-giving, the obligation is a moral one, 
and a supreme one for that. Exactly for this reason utang na loob causes a de-moralization 
of the individual, because by the overarching need to fulfil his obligation he “overlooks 
moral principles […]. One who is beholden to another person will do anything to please 
him, thinking that by doing so, he is able to repay the debt. One condones what the other 
person does and will never censure him for wrongdoing” (Quito 1994: 60).  
It is no coincidence, that a large number of local officials or their relatives are said to 
be active in the jueteng business. Jueteng business is not only an economic lifeline, but also 
a cultural one, because it enables those very politicians to respond as ideal patrons to their 
clients’ demands and thereby stabilize the social order which puts them on top. The clever 
jueteng lord and the good community leader share the same attributes in the eyes of the 
local populace. The community leader like  
“the patron who operates or tolerates jueteng is always there, ready with cash to be given to 
anyone who needs it. […] When asked to characterize a good leader, community members 
[…] pictured a person who is dependable, helpful, generous, and approachable. This is 
exactly the same description they gave of the patron and the Jueteng lord. A leader for them 
is someone with resources who can immediately respond to their daily needs. It does not 
matter if that leader is diligent, has integrity, or adheres to a long-term developmental 
framework that will eventually benefit the community. It also did not matter to those asked 
that the source of funds used to provide for community needs is illegal. What was 
important to them was that an influential and worthy person was taking good care of them 
and their community. Thus, the culture of dependence that jueteng fosters in communities 
is something that the patron will try forever to maintain.” (Gregorio-Medel, Angelita, 
reprinted in: Nery (ed.). 2003: 109).  
It is this dual position on both sides of the legal-illegal divide and the social and cultural 
rootedness of the practices themselves, that makes Philippine politics similar to 
traditional Mafia-activities in Southern Italy.  
Mostly these interactions function smoothly and are invisible to the public, especially 
so, because intra-elite competition with respect to Jueteng is not so much characterized by 
violent clashes, but by mediation, or as Fabella points out “(t)urf disputes and takeovers 
are more often resolved at the level of the padrino” (Fabella 2007: 109). However, the role 
of vertical violence is less clear. It might well be that gambling debts are a very serious 
issue and defaulting debtors are threatened with violence in order to enforce the rules of 
the game. One staff member of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines 
(CBCP) told the author in an interview that in gambling  
“violence is part of the game. […] So you will see a lot of disappearances. The police will say 
‘Yes, it was a personal quarrel. He had been liquidated.’ You just see somebody dumped 
somewhere. No, this is because of gambling. […] Another level of government sponsored 
violence - because of gambling. Gambling brings about violence in this country. […] The 
nut of violence, although it is not reported as such, is the fruit of gambling. Because down 
the line, to the village level, the moment […] you fail to pay even just 100 Pesos, you're 
dead” (Interview Manila, 12 February 2010).  
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5.2  Jueteng as a multitiered racket 
Another aspect that should not go unnoticed is the high degree of vertical integration of 
networks that go from the local grassroots level to the highest offices of state, in effect 
linking large numbers of political and state-actors on different levels of illicit business 
ventures.  
Even though violence in connection to Jueteng is most certainly by and large a 
problem on the local level only, the networks reach to the highest levels of politics and the 
accompanying violence is at least condoned by all politicians and public officials on all 
levels of politics. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines from 2001 to 
2010 and currently a member of Congress, had her own Jueteng scandal in 2005 when her 
husband and son were accused of having taken protection-money from Jueteng operators; 
once more the police also seem to have profited. When pressure on the president became 
strong, her husband went abroad for an extended “holiday”. Even though a number of 
ledgers with the exact data on dates and sums of payments as well as a number of 
testimonies existed, the political investigations broke down and prosecutionary 
investigations were never initiated, as after a few months two core witnesses retracted 
their testimony (McCoy 2009: 246). Lacson, it might be reminded, fled the country in 
February 2010, avoiding charges of ordering the murder of a journalist.  
The most prominent Jueteng scandal happened in 2000 and led to the downfall of 
Arroyo’s predecessor as President, Joseph Estrada, who was eventually convicted of 
plunder in 2007.22 Estrada’s conviction (see: Sandigbanyan 2007) rested not only on 
taking a cut of illegal Jueteng profits, but on various other illegal activities (i.e. 
misappropriation of tobacco excise tax, commissions for ordering state institutions to 
purchase stocks in specific firms, etc.). For the sake of brevity we will only take a short 
look at Estrada’s Jueteng-connection, which exhibits everything it takes to compare it to 
organized crime: a complex and highly sophisticated horizontal and vertical organization 
designed to maximize profit in an illegal business venture and, in case, things go wrong, 
the will to use violence. The core players, however, are not “criminals” but politicians and 
public officials. 
According to the main witness Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, he himself, 
the President and a businessman, who then worked as a gaming consultant of the 
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (Pagcor) together with Bong Pineda, 
Jueteng-lord of Pampanga and adjacent regions, decided on the kickbacks due to the 
president for the various regions of Luzon a few weeks after Estrada’s election in 1998. 
The money was to be delivered every 15th and at the end of the month. Most of the time, it 
was Governor Singson, who delivered the money in cash - about ten Million Pesos (more 
than 200,000 US$) per month. Part of the money then went to those from whom 
 
 
22  Both Arroyo and Estrada had already been linked to Jueteng in 1995 through the documents submitted 
and testimony given by then Philippine National Police Bataan superintendent Elnora Bernardino.  
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protection had to be bought, for example the police. As the court decision details, in 
November 1998 three million Pesos were “given to the Office of the Chief of the 
Philippine National Police (PNP), who initially refused to receive the money. After a 
meeting with the president, the Police chief changed his mind. However, he “expressed 
the need to coordinate with the Regional Commanders to apprehend jueteng operations 
for show only (‘kunwari’)” (Sandigbanyan 2007).  
The governor of Ilocos Sur, Chavit Singson, not only delivered the President’s 
kickbacks from Jueteng, but also the profits of other deals. For example in February 1999, 
when 20 million Pesos were allotted for the repair of the capitol of the province, the 
president received a kickback of 4 million. In the meantime during all these years, Singson 
was provided with money to dispense to various persons mentioned by the president.  
The above two Presidential examples show that even though Jueteng protection 
rackets originate at the local level, some if not many, have further layers upwards to the 
highest levels of politics. They are highly organized integrated networks which include the 
operators, the politicians and the state security institutions. Boundaries between politics 
and crime not only blur, but are essentially fuzzy, the politician doubling as statesman and 
“mafia-godfather”. This pattern of mafia-style politics is nicely complemented by the way 
the racket’s cover was blown. This was neither the work of the police or the prosecution, 
as for example in Italy, but the result of a power struggle between Singson and Estrada in 
the course of which Singson feared for his life and decided for a “forward defence”.23 His 
revelations brought him legal immunity, safeguarded his political position in his home 
province Ilocos Sur, which had been threatened by presidential action, and brought down 
the president.  
Despite having been convicted, in the meantime Joseph Estrada has been back in 
politics as presidential candidate in the 2010 elections, after having been pardoned by his 
successor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Estrada’s eldest son Jose Pimentel (Jinggoy) Ejercito 
Estrada was elected Senator in 2004 winning again in 2010. Another son, Joseph V. 
Ejercito, was mayor of San Juan City from 2001 to 2010, when he opted for a 
congressional seat in the 2010 elections, which he won unopposed. Joseph Estrada’s wife 
Guia Gomez took over as mayor of San Juan City with 82 percent of the votes and an ally 
won the contest for vice-mayor with 92 percent. Another family member, Jannah Ejercito 
scored highest for the city council of the second district of San Juan City. Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo and the wife of suspected Jueteng-lord Rodolfo Pineda, Lilia Pineda 
won in the 2010 elections. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo will be accompanied to congress by 
other family members, her son Diosdado (Camarines Sur 2nd district) and her brother-in-
 
 
23  According to Singson the Presidential camp even offered him to kill a Pagcor consultant and Estrada 
confidant, if only Singson put the blame on the latter and not the President. One person according to 
Singson’s statement made clear that “they will take care of Atong Ang. Alfredo Lim gestured with his right 
fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to mean that Atong Ang will be killed” (Sandigbanyan 
2007).  
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law Ignacio Jr. (Negros Occidental 5th district). Her son Mikey Arroyo, who had held the 
position of congressman, now taken by his mother, garnered a congressional seat for the 
party list group Ang Galing Pinoy. Later, there were efforts to disqualify him, because he 
definitely is no member of the sector the party list group supposedly represents: tricycle 
drivers and security guards. Would Arroyo be disqualified, the second on the list could 
take his place: Dennis Pineda, the son of Bong and Lilia Pineda.  
In Ilocos Sur the 2010 elections saw the return of Deputy National Security Advisor 
Luis Chavit Singson to the post of Governor. Vigan City Mayor Eva Marie Singson-
Medina and Candon City Mayor Allen G. Singson continued on their jobs unopposed. 
Vigan being the provincial capital and Candon the center of the second district of this 
province. Further family members elected for office in the 2010 elections were Ronald 
Verzoa Singson for Congressman 1st district, Eric Gacula Singson Jr. for Congressman 2nd 
district, Jeremias Crisologo for provincial board member 1st district and Charmian W. 
Singson Zaragosa for provincial board member 2nd district.  
The pattern exemplified with respect to Jueteng business is no aberration from an 
otherwise well working economic and political system, but illustrates the most 
fundamental character of the Philippine variant of capitalism, which has been termed 
“booty capitalism” by Hutchroft, quite similar to Henner Hess’ description of the “Mafia 
as adventure capitalism” (Hess 2009: 165), both of which aim at “parasitic profits through 
particular political conditions” (Hess 2009: 167), or “rent seeking” where “access to the 
state machinery is the major avenue to capitalist accumulation” (Hutchcroft 1998: 19) and 
is not seldom supplemented with illegal practices. With respect to jueteng as with all other 
fields of legal or illegal business, there is little incentive for the oligarchy to press for 
change as the system is exactly in that condition which allows for a maximization of 
particularistic benefit.  
6.  Conclusion 
In this report, I presented the Philippines as a criminalized polity. Many of the practices 
and attitudes described closely, resemble the Mafia’s – albeit not the very modern one, 
which seems to have largely withdrawn from the political realm and become, what one 
might call a set of “purely criminal enterprises”. In the old Mafia as in Philippine politics, 
governance and criminal activity regularly go together; in both cases state institutions are 
penetrated and transformed into resources for “non-state”, private governance. At the 
same time private organizations up to fairly comprehensive local “outlaw regimes” are 
built up for purposes of safeguarding elite domination and the social order which flows 
out of this paradigm, a local order which at the same time connects to deep-seated and 
widely shared cultural patterns of social organization and practice. And in both cases 
there are no moral restraints, which could prevent the criminalization of politics and 
governance. Whereas it can be said that Philippine politics is crime to a significant extent, 
the above presentation showed that Mafia crime for most of the time was politics. In both 
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cases the resultant regimes are hybrids, which cannot be adequately analyzed by 
employing one of the contending paradigms – the political or the criminal – only.  
Initially in both Sicily and the Philippines private agents provided governance on the 
basis of local monopolies or near-monopolies of power and violence. In Sicily those 
agents had to transform themselves from representatives of a hegemonic social order into 
relatively highly organized and closed “secret societies” in order to survive in a state 
which they could not conquer, as the Italian state was much larger than the small regions 
controlled by the Mafia. As the Mafia eventually had to settle with some sorts of local 
monopolies of violence, which coalesced into some forms of regional oligopolies in the 
context of an overall hostile state, it came to be seen as a criminal organization. 
To a certain extent the modern Philippine political elite set out from a similar starting 
point, locally controlling land and people via coercion based patron-client relations. 
However, they did not have to “go underground”, because of a rather strong and hostile 
state they could not capture. Quite to the contrary, as landlord politicians the elite 
members, step by step, captured the various levels of political control since the late 
Spanish colonial era. By taking over the state they made sure, that the state did not 
become fully functioning, because otherwise this very state could have broken their 
stranglehold on positions of power and wealth. Patronal stranglehold, Howard Stein 
writes, “requires the very gap which it assists the client in bridging. For surely the patron 
does not help his clients to change the system (or themselves) and thereby abolish the 
gap” (Stein 1984: 31). In Stein’s view patronage is similar to a protection racquet insofar 
as it “requires the hostile universe it mediates” (Stein 1984: 33). Any significant 
improvement of state capacity would be a fundamental threat to the interests of the 
political class as its clients would gain a real alternative to the clientelist relationships, 
instrumental friendship or reciprocal but asymmetric utang na loob relations which today 
still provide their only entry-points to tangible and intangible resources. While the state 
might fail or under-perform significantly, this very failure or under-performance 
guarantees the continued multidimensional control of the elite.  
With respect to legitimacy it is crucial to remember, that the traditional Mafia was not 
seen as criminal on the local level. The traditional leaders of the various mafia groups also 
did “not consider themselves to be bandits or outlaws. Indeed, they portrayed themselves 
as men who favored law and order, even showing formal deference to state authority” 
(Paoli 2003: 188). This self-evaluation was by and large consistent with local perceptions 
and the social status they enjoyed (Paoli 2003, Sabetti 2002, Fentress 2000). This still holds 
true for Philippine politics where politicians, who employ violence and resort to 
corruption and illegal business opportunities, actually fill a cultural role, which has been 
created by their forebears, kept alive and developed by them and which is expected by the 
local populace. The important aspect is not whether something is illegal or not, but 
whether the spoils are doled out to the clients and the clients accept the accompanying 
rules of the game. In this respect good politicians conform to the expectations of their 
clients and care for their constituents to a certain extent.  
At first sight, this does not bode well for reform. As Raul Fabella states in his analysis 
of Philippine politics “[b]ad institutions persist because they are consistent with the 
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dominant group’s drive for wealth and power” (Fabella 2006: 105). This report clearly 
underlines Fabella’s conclusion. However it further posits that these institutions also 
persist, because those practices, which are employed to compensate for the institutional 
malfunction, are not only in the interest of the elite, but also consistent with the 
subordinate groups’ cultural frame and perceived self-interest. Both sides uphold the 
ruling order, which includes private political violence substituting for the state as well as 
illegal business and rent-seeking, the profits of which are used for the selective 
particularistic satisfaction of clients’ short-term interests. If there is hardly any top-down 
interest in comprehensive reform and significant bottom-up pressure cannot be expected 
as many of the crucial practices are by-products or deformations of widely shared and 
demanded behavioral patterns and normative positions: where should reform apply?  
With Boege et al, it could be argued, that customary institutions should be 
strengthened as part of a holistic effort to decriminalize politics. Boege et al argue that 
kinship-based societal formations should not be viewed as inherently corrupt and 
nepotistic, but as specific social configurations which can provide social support 
networks, likewise  
“community resilience and customary institutions [should be perceived; P.K.] as assets and 
sources of solutions that can be drawn upon in order to forge constructive relationships 
between communities and governments, and between customary and introduced political 
and social institutions” (Boege et al. 2008: 16). 
This report sides more with Mehler, who in his critique points out that “the hybrid regime 
[…] will not be the kind of functional mix of ‘modern’ and ‘customary’ institutions […] 
but rather ‘more of the same’” (Mehler 2008: 63). Even though there always has to be 
some kind of enculturation of all kinds of political institutions, it would be naïve to 
imagine a (selective) return to “real” traditions and customs as a comprehensive solution 
to criminalized governance under modern conditions of stateness. As a large number of 
the social practices of criminalized governance successfully pose as or resemble customary 
practices, strengthening “custom” would most likely result in a further strengthening of 
private uses of violence in contexts of political competition and domination.  
This report therefore argues for a decisive effort at state-strengthening in the 
Philippines, mostly aiming at insulating the state against political interference that 
seriously impairs the professional working of its agencies. The aim must be to influence 
the opportunity cost calculations of the political actors, by significantly raising the costs of 
illegal behavior. The head of the EU-Philippine Justice Support Programme (EPJUST),24 
Detlev Mehlis, a senior public prosecutor with the German attorney general’s office in 
Berlin, hit the nail right on the head, when he argued that the Philippine criminal justice 
system “isn’t working. It needs to be thoroughly overhauled. Cases drag on for years, 
witnesses are killed, die or simply disappear. There has to be a reason why only 10 per 
 
 
24  EPJUST commenced in 2010 and aims at a fairly comprehensive analysis of the weaknesses of the law 
enforcement system of the Philippines, from the police to the courts. 
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cent of all murder cases are ever solved in this country” (Detlev Mehlis, cited in: Wilson 
2010). Put simply, for politicians it pays to go illegal, because they control to a large extent 
the local law enforcement agencies and can either render them ineffective or co-opt them. 
This is based on inadequate law-making, on republican acts that, time and again, stress 
local political control. Most problematic is, that city and municipal mayors exercise 
operational supervision and control over the local PNP units, meaning, that they have 
“the power to direct, superintend, oversee and inspect the police units and forces” 
(Republican Act 6975 Sect 52b). Add to this the power to impose certain administrative 
disciplinary penalties on members of the local PNP, the power to choose the local police-
chief out of a list of eligibles and to recommend the transfer, reassignment or detail of 
PNP members outside of their respective city or town residences and it becomes obvious 
that the local PNP depends on the goodwill of the local mayor. Additionally, mayors are 
empowered to build-up police auxiliary organizations, the Civilian Volunteer 
Organizations, provided that these are financed out of the local budget. They are likewise 
responsible for the assessment of the CVOs’ performance. Laws and regulations like these, 
while not inherently problematic, do, in the context of Philippine politics, quite often lend 
themselves to abuse and ought to be replaced.  
Needed is a reform which denies politicians’ control over the state’s institutional 
structure for criminal purposes. Especially the Philippine police-officers and prosecutors 
have to be enabled to “say no” to and to initiate investigations against politicians as if the 
latter were “normal citizens”. This requires a fundamental rethinking with respect to the 
relationship between politics and law enforcement on the various political levels. The 
current setup is in crucial aspects a return to the pre-martial law regime, when “police 
chiefs and policemen were appointed by the elected municipal mayor” (Machado 1979: 
297). The collective memory of an integrated police-force is still heavily informed by the 
negative experience of the Marcos years, when the police were used as a repressive 
mechanism. This, however, was not the result of its integration, but of the continued 
politicization, then, however, more in a top-down fashion compared to the decades before 
and after. Despite being integrated, the police were not insulated. Only by bringing both 
aspects together can the desired effects be achieved. 
The aims of insulation, integration and professionalization additionally require a 
significant strengthening of the police with respect to manpower, salary, equipment, 
expertise and capabilities; a demand which also applies to the prosecution and the wider 
court system, all of which need a significant overhaul. All semi-regular forces, of which 
the CVOs are only the most prominent ones should likewise be either abolished or 
integrated into an integrated police-service with a strict organizational hierarchy. A 
similar logic applies to the CAFGU-units that are supposed to support the Armed Forces 
in their fight against the Communist and Muslim insurgents and the special CAFGU that 
quite often are employed by private firms. They have to be reduced numerically and 
integrated into the (reformed) police-force. With respect to both crime-control as well as 
counter-insurgency warfare, we need a reversal of the general policy-line that politicizes 
and delegates to the broader society central tasks of the state like the provision of public 
security. Time and again, analyzes of deficient state performance have led to strategies of 
“outsourcing” instead of strategies that aimed at a reform of the institutions deemed 
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insufficient.25 Thereby local forces’ capability at autonomous action was significantly 
strengthened – with all its advantages and disadvantages.  
It is not to be expected that the political elite easily lends its hand for a reform that 
diminishes its political clout over the everyday working of the state administration and its 
patronal position over its clients. However, there are fault lines within the elite with 
respect to business and political interests and the new Aquino administration exhibits a 
certain dose of reformism. This administration has a significant amount of “business 
expertise” as for example the new Secretary of the Department of Tourism, Alberto Lim, 
who up to this year headed the influential Makati Business Club; or Cayetano Paderanga 
Jr., a former professor of Economics at the University of the Philippines, General Director 
of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) under the former 
President Corazon Aquino and Executive Director for the Philippines with the Asian 
Development Bank. Paderanga was appointed NEDA Secretary. The new Secretary of the 
Department of Agrarian Reform, Virgilio de los Reyes is one of the founding members of 
an association of lawyers who focus on human rights and judicial reform. Mention should 
also be made of Florencio Abad, who in earlier decades, before becoming Congressman, 
was active as a trade unionist and Secretary of Agrarian reform. Abad is the newly 
appointed secretary of the Department of Budget Management. The new Secretary of the 
Department of Justice, Leila de Lima, who up to July 2010 headed the Commission on 
Human Rights, and her colleague Teresita Deles, the newly appointed presidential adviser 
on the peace process, are certainly good choices for anybody who heads for earnest 
reforms.26  
Beyond the reformers in the administration there is a vociferous civil society, which, 
however, mistrusts significant parts of the new administration as it deems them to be 
either “old faces” or neo-liberals. Even though there obviously are significant ideological 
differences between the administration’s “neo-liberals” and Civil Society Organizations, 
the latter should realize, that with Lim or Caetano they are at least dealing with 
 
 
25  Insufficient police performance led to the creation of various police auxiliaries and at times even the 
toleration or active support of vigilante organizations, deficits in the counter-insurgency led to the 
establishment of military auxiliaries and various vigilante organizations, significant problems in the 
judicial system led to the establishment of the Barangay Justice System (Katarungang Pambarangay). 
Even though most of these institutions are supposedly under the control of the state, they nevertheless 
work towards a strengthening of local level political executives’ powers. 
26 However, it should not be forgotten that both the Estrada and the Arroyo-governments started out as 
reform-governments with a large number of former civil society leaders joining the government. It is 
worthwhile to take a short look back at those forerunners of the current administration. Reid (2008) 
argues that “the Estrada and Arroyo administrations encouraged a process of ‘crossover’ of select NGO 
personnel into the state executive.” In both cases elite political actors made personal offers to key activists 
who had at times “played some role in their path to power. In keeping with the clientelist and 
semiclientelist model, there were strong notions of reciprocity and bargaining in negotiations over power 
sharing. […] Ultimately, the crossover of personnel led to disillusion and failure. […] The notion of 
crossover, therefore, ultimately realized few enduring changes. What occurred was a hegemonic process 
that helped generate consent to the power of two elite political regimes.” (Reid 2008: 35-36).  
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representatives of an economic perspective that aims at reform because current practices 
bring about suboptimal results.  
However, and most importantly, reformists should rethink their focus on further 
democratization. Irrespective of political field, the general argument is for 
decentralization, consultation, enhanced participation and “empowerment” of civil 
society actors and the local level of politics, even though it stands to reason that 
Philippine politics is confusingly fragmented and overpoliticized. Adding further 
participants will not resolve the problems of a chaotic muddle, in which in the end 
traditional politicians are the only ones, who can command obedience and push things 
through – albeit in a patronal fashion. Decentralization, devolution, enhanced civil society 
participation and the like will not bring about the desired results as the state is subservient 
to the whims of politicians in its everyday dealings. The very best to be expected then are 
“reformist politicians” here and there. This, however, will not change the structural flaws 
of an over-politicized state.  
Especially international donors and indigenous civil society should not only look at 
grass-roots empowerment and enhanced participation for civil society organizations. 
These are valid objectives, as they might add some democratic controls on the various 
levels of politics. However, they do not help in reducing the extraordinarily high 
politicization of the national administration. They only add further actors who try to tug 
the local and national administrators towards their favored direction of action.  
The work of EPJUST is one effort which goes in the right direction, insofar as it 
focuses on providing some input and concrete suggestions for enhancing the capacity and 
effectiveness of the Philippine justice system with respect to investigation, prosecution 
and bringing to justice perpetrators of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. 
However, the superordinate legal frame, in which the law enforcement authorities’ work 
has to be changed accordingly – this, however, is far beyond the mandate of EPJUST 
(www.epjust.org/mandate.html). It is here, where the local civil society and the 
international donor organizations can come in, giving support to a reconsideration of the 
legal frame which makes the PNP dependent on political support on the local level and 
reduces the role of para-state organizations in the provision of public security.  
All of these measures will only have limited success as long as they are not integrated 
into a much broader effort at institutional reform, which includes significant changes in 
the incentive structure for the political and administrative elite on the various levels of 
government. These measures, however, should not aim at the disempowerment of the 
current political actors, as these are the very ones who would have to formulate and 
initiate them in the first place, but at a regularization and institutionalization of 
government and the strengthening of the rule of law. At least a number of those who are 
not engaging in “primitive” but “sophisticated accumulation” which does not rest on 
(coercive) rent-seeking are certainly open to such changes, as they promise to reduce 
costs (corruption) and enhance the developmental capacities of state and society and 
thereby prospects of growth and profit. Even though Civil Society and these political and 
economic elites follow fundamentally different paradigms they should be able to unite on 
the common aims of civilizing and institutionalizing politics and insulating 
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administration. Such reforms, even though implementable only in an incremental fashion 
will over time confront the local and national politics with changed incentives for political 
action. In a further step these new incentives and slowly changing rules of the game could 
then “trickle down” to the population and result in changed expectations through which 
slowly the cultural patterns which undergird the current patterns of criminalized behavior 
may change.  
Needed is an indefinite extension of the gun-ban, which is currently enacted regularly 
for the months preceding elections. If such a ban is feasible in times of heightened 
political competition, there is no rational argument against it at other times.27  
Even more ambitious would be the abolishment of the large array of pork-barrel funds 
(Priority Assistance Fund) available to individual legislators, who are empowered to 
identify the projects which are to be supported by those funds.28 This should be 
complemented with a strengthening of the Commission on Audit (COA), so that 
malfeasance and corruption do not go unpunished anymore.  
The most ambitious and most complicated reforms would deal with the institutional 
incentives for the continued merging of extralegal and legal patterns of governance 
provided for by the political institutions themselves. While the advisability of 
constitutional reform may be criticized from a number of viewpoints, from a perspective 
focusing on the decriminalization of politics it could be essential to exchange the current 
single-member district plurality system of elections with a system of proportional 
representation. The latter holds the potential of uncoupling political office from local 
dominance and “enforces” the strengthening of political parties in the sense of durable 
and nation-wide machineries (institution-building). Add to this a threshold for 
representation and the fragmentation along a multitude of competing parties, which is 
initially to be expected, could at least be limited. Whereas currently there are no 
incentives for integrating one’s personal or familial interest into a larger whole and the 
national level elites have to bargain with a host of local powerholders for an exchange of 
votes for other gratifications, this would be reversed to a certain extent under a system of 
proportional representation.  
 
 
27  The PNP is openly pushing for a total gun ban, however, new President Aquino holds a contrary opinion, 
ridiculing the proposal as “a law to control the behavior of the outlaws. By definition, the outlaw is 
beyond the law, not to live within the law, so I don’t (see) the logic of a law controlling the behavior of 
somebody who does not follow the law” (Aquino cited in Philippine Star 2010).  
28  Current policy points in the opposite direction. For 2011 the Priority Development Assistance Fund for 
lawmakers was raised to P22.3 billion from P10.86 billion in 2010. To this must be added the Special 
Purpose Funds, which as lump-sum appropriation are highly vulnerable to misuse. During the last years 
of the Arroyo-administration these funds rose to more than half of the total budget for new 
appropriations (www.congress.gov.ph/download/cpbd/fnf_2008_01_spf.pdf). Debate on these funds is 
non-public and there are no minutes of the committee meetings which decide on the allocation 
(GMANews.TV 2006). 
Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime 35 
 
 
In addition, it seems necessary to provide for public financing of political parties. At 
the same time it is necessary to tightly restrict or abolish all other forms of financing, so 
office-holders would no longer need to plunder the public purse to recoup their outlays 
nor need they cater to the interests of private financial backers any longer.  
In combination, the above mentioned measures should go a long way to reduce 
violence and criminal governance by politicians. However, all of these proposals go in one 
way or another against the interests of the elite, ruling on the local and national level. 
Several of these measures have been discussed for years, if not for decades. Additionally 
they go to a certain extent against the cultural patterns that favor personalism over 
institutionalism and demand particularistic favoritism from the ruling ones. They all need 
an intensive cooperation of reform-oriented politicians and business leaders, civil society 
organizations and international actors, who have to grapple with an interest-based status 
quo orientation of a significant number of the established elite and a traditionalist 
orientation on the side of the large mass of the population. With traditionalist and non- 
or superficial democratic orientations of a majority in both the elite and the broader 
population,29 the fight for a way out of the impasse of criminalized patronal-coercive 
politics is certainly an uphill battle.  
 
 
29  For detailed survey data on traditional and non-democratic attitudes in the Philippines compared to other 
Asian countries see the data of the Asian Barometer surveys as presented in a large number of studies 
www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/). For older data see the World Values Survey datasets 
on the Philippines (www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).  
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